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DUMPING THE "DESIGNATION OF SOURCE"
REQUIREMENT FROM THE TDRA: A RESPONSE
TO THE ALLEGED "TRADEMARK USE
REQUIREMENT IN DILUTION CASES" *
William G. Barbert
Abstract
It will probably come as no great surprise to anyone who has
read Professor Lemley's and Professor Dogan's article, The
Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, that I disagree with
much of it. In particular,I disagree with the main thesis of their
article that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 ("TDRA')'
embodies a "trademark use requirement," as well as their argument
that the legislative history supports that conclusion. As explained in
more detail below, the language of the TDRA as enacted fails to
support that thesis (although I acknowledge there may be some
superficialambiguity in the phrase "use of a mark or trade name ).2
More importantly, the clear intent of the participants involved in
negotiating changes in the bill (including the International
TrademarkAssociation ["INTA ', the American IntellectualProperty
Law Association ["AIPLA "],the American Civil Liberties Union
["A CL U"], and the applicable Congressional leaders and staff) was
to remove the trademark use requirement originally proposed by
INTA and supported by Professor Lemley at the Congressional
hearingon the TDRA.

* © 2008 William G. Barber. This article is a response to an article by Professors
Stacey L. Dogan and Mark A. Lemley entitled, "The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution
Cases." I would like to thank Professors Dogan and Lemley for sending me a draft of their
article for comment in advance of publication, as well as the Santa Clara Computer & High
Technology Law Journalfor publishing this response.
t Mr. Barber is the Managing Partner of Pirkey Barber LLP in Austin, Texas. The
opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to
Pirkey Barber LLP or any of its clients.
I. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)).
2.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1).
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ORIGIN OF THE PHRASE "USE OF A MARK OR TRADE NAME" IN
3
THE TDRA

The first fundamental flaw in Professor Lemley's and Professor
Dogan's position is their suggestion that the phrase "use of a mark or
trade name" in the TDRA "clarified" its predecessor statute (the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act ["FTDA"]) in a way that would
require trademark use by the defendant.4 Although Professors Lemley
and Dogan are correct that the language in the old FTDA did not
clearly impose such a requirement, they have it exactly backwards
when they assert that the counterpart language in the TDRA makes
the argument for a trademark use requirement "more robust than
before." '
Here is a comparison of the operative language appearing in the
FTDA and TDRA:

3.
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West Supp. 2007)). Professor Lemley's and
Professor Dogan's basis for the alleged trademark use requirement in the TDRA centers on the
phrase in the act proscribing the defendant's "use of a mark or trade name" that is likely to
dilute the plaintiff's famous mark. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use
Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH. L.J. 541, 549-54
(2008) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use]. Perhaps one of the reasons leading to
their misinterpretation of this phrase was their initial misunderstanding of its origin. In the initial
draft of their article, Professors Lemley and Dogan erroneously asserted that the phrase "use of a
mark or trade name" in the TDRA replaced the phrase "commercial use in commerce" in the
FTDA. That is not true. The phrase "use of a mark or trade name" in the TDRA was carried
forwardfrom (not a "replacement" of) virtually identical language in the FTDA. Compare the
FTDA's "commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name," 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(l)
(2000), with the TDRA's "use of a mark or trade name in commerce", 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)
(West Supp. 2007). They later retreated from their original position, now asserting that the
TDRA's language merely "clarifies" (not "replaces") language in the FTDA. See Dogan &
Lemley, Trademark Use, at 555 n.66. I address this argument in Parts I and IIIof this article.
Similarly, in the initial draft of their article, Professors Lemley and Dogan
erroneously suggested that the phrase "mark or trade name" was inserted into H.R. 683 (the bill
that became the TDRA), H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005), through an amendment replacing the
term "designation of source" with "mark or trade name." Once again, that is not true. As
explained later in this paper, see discussion infra Part ILE, the phrase "designation of source" which is at the very heart of this issue because it was specifically designed to introduce a
trademark use requirement - was simply removed from the bill following extensive debate and
negotiation. It was not "replaced" with anything. (The phrase "use of a mark or trade name," on
the other hand, appeared in the original version of H.R. 683, and was never changed throughout
the legislative process. Compare H.R 683 with 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)). Professors Lemley
and Dogan now concede this point as well, but persist in their argument that the trademark use
requirement survived this key amendment to H.R. 683. See Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use,
at 553.
4.

See Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use, supra note 3, at 549-54.

5.

Id at 541.
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FTDA
"The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled... to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use... causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark .... , 6
TDRA
"[T]he owner of a famous mark.., shall be entitled to an
injunction against another person who.., commences use of a mark
or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring
or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark ....
As can be seen, the "mark or trade name" language that
Professors Lemley and Dogan rely upon to support a trademark use
requirement appeared in both statutes. The only change in this clause
was to eliminate the word "commercial" in the FTDA (and move "in
commerce"). It is simply inaccurate for Professors Lemley and Dogan
this language in the TDRA as "more restrictive, 8 or
to characterize
"narrower" 9 than the corresponding language in the FTDA - if
anything, the phrase "use of a mark or trade name in commerce" is
less restrictive than "commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name," omitting the explicit requirement that the defendant's use be
"commercial."
II. THE FAILED ATTEMPT TO INSERT A TRADEMARK USE
REQUIREMENT INTO THE

TDRA

An even more fundamental flaw in Professor Lemley's and
Professor Dogan's argument is their suggestion that the legislative
history of the TDRA supports a trademark use requirement.' ° Once
again, they have it exactly backwards. To the extent there is any
ambiguity as to whether the phrase "use of a mark or trade name" in
the TDRA was intended to impose a trademark use requirement as
Professors Lemley and Dogan claim, that door is completely slammed
shut by the legislative history of the act.

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)( I) (2000) (emphasis added).

15 U.S.C.A. § 125(c)(1) (West Supp. 2007) (emphasis added).
Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use, supra note 3, at 557.
Id. at 555 n.67.
Id. at 552-54.
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A. INTA's OriginalProposal
The TDRA traces its roots back to INTA's "Select Committee on
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,"11 whose mission was to review
the FTDA and recommend changes in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.12 As reflected in its
report dated September 18, 2003, the Select Committee was keenly
concerned about the very language Professors Lemley and Dogan rely
on in their article as incorporating a trademark use requirement. The
Committee felt it was not clear that such language required use as a
trademark by the defendant.1 3 Specifically, page five of the report
states:
The Committee believes that there is a need to clarify a key
threshold question regarding one of the elements of the current
dilution statute - the "commercial use as a mark or trade name."
The Committee believes that this is a core element that resolves
many of the issues surrounding various free speech defenses, but
only if interpreted to require use as a source indicatorfor the
user's [the defendant's] own goods or services. Accordingly, the
Committee finds that should a new statute be drafted, it should
clearly require as an element use as a source indicatorfor the
user's [the defendant's] own goods or services. 14
Accordingly, the draft statute prepared by INTA's Select
Committee would have provided injunctive relief against a person
who uses "as a designation of source of the person's goods or
services, a mark or trade name that is likely to cause dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment." 15
B. 2004 Committee Print
On April 22, 2004, Congressman Lamar Smith, Chair of the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and

Memorandum from the Select Committee on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to
II.
the INTA Board of Directors (Sept. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Select Committee Memorandum] (on
file with author).
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
12.
As Professors Dogan and Lemley concede, at least some courts applied the FTDA to
13.
non-trademark uses by defendants. As an example, they cite Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97-Civ-0629, 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997). See Dogan &
Lemley, Trademark Use, supra note 3, at 546. Other examples include decisions applying the
FTDA to domain names, such as in Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th
Cir. 1998).
14.

See INTA, Select Committee Memorandum, supra note II, at 5.

15.

Id. at Exhibit B 43(x)(l)(a).
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Intellectual Property ("House IP Subcommittee"), circulated a
committee print of a bill to amend the FTDA.' 6 Consistent with the
report of INTA's Select Committee, INTA President Jacqueline A.
Leimer's testimony emphasized the significance of the proposed
"designation of source" requirement:
[W]e recommend that a revised dilution statute expressly provide
as an essential element of the cause of action for dilution... that
the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant is using the challenged
mark as a "designation of source" (e.g., trademark, trade name,
logo, etc.) for the defendant's own goods or services.
A requirement of defendant's use as a designation of source will
prevent any descriptive fair use or nominative fair use from falling
within the ambit of the revised statute .... Moreover, the

requirement of use as a designation of source for the junior user's
own goods or services should protect all legitimate parody and
satire, even if that parody and satire appears in a commercial
context. It is INTA's strong belief that this requirement is
necessary to protect free speech 7 and to ensure that dilution
protection is appropriately limited.1
C. Negotiations Between AIPLA and INTA
On May 15, 2004, the AIPLA Board of Directors adopted a
resolution recommending a number of changes to the committee print,
including (among others): (1) deletion of the requirement in
subsection (c)(1) that the defendant's use be "as a designation of
source of the person's goods or services," and (2) addition of a new
exclusion in subsection (c)(3) protecting "use of a famous mark to
comment on, criticize, or parody the owner of the famous mark or the
goods or services in connection with which the famous mark is
used." 8 AIPLA communicated these recommendations to both the
House IP Subcommittee staff and INTA.19
Over the next several months, AIPLA and INTA (and to a lesser
degree the American Bar Association Intellectual Property Law
Section ["ABA IPL"] and the Intellectual Property Owners

16. See Comm. Print to Amend the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary,

108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearingto Amend the FTDA].
17. Id.at 12 (statement ofJacqueline A. Leimer, President, INTA).
18. See AIPLA, Past Action Manual, Resolution No. 425-09 (May 15, 2004).
19.
E-mail from Vincent E. Garlock, Deputy Executive Director, AIPLA, to William G.
Barber (July 27, 2004, 9:16 CST) (on file with author).

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. t.J.

564

[Vol. 24

Association ["IPO"]) negotiated to try to resolve their differences
regarding the proposed legislation. During these discussions, AIPLA
expressed its concern that INTA's proposed "designation of source"
requirement would leave gaping holes in the dilution statute and open
the door to many types of uses that were traditionally actionable
under a dilution claim, such as domain names, 20 abusive uses, 21 and
generic uses of the plaintiff's trademark in a commercial context.22
AIPLA also questioned whether INTA's members (i.e. trademark
owners) would be in favor of such a requirement. However, INTA
would not budge on the "designation of source" requirement, saying it
was the linchpin of INTA's entire proposal.
D. The House IP Subcommittee Hearingon H.R. 683
The negotiations between AIPLA and INTA reached a dead end
23
and each party was left to make its arguments to Congress.
Chairman Smith introduced H.R. 683 on February 9, 2005, and
scheduled a hearing on February 17, 2005.24 The original version of
the bill included the "designation of source" requirement as follows:
[T]he owner of a famous mark.., shall be entitled to an injunction
against another person who.., commences use of a mark or trade
name in commerce as a designation of source of the person's
goods or services that 25is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tamishment.
Based on the stalled negotiations between AIPLA, INTA, and
other organizations, it was clear to all of the parties involved heading
into the hearing that the "designation of source" requirement in H.R.

20.
See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that registration of mark in Internet domain names diluted those marks).

21.
See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a
caricature of competitor's logo in TV commercial); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (involving a por movie featuring Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders uniforms); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (involving a magazine depicting "Poppin' Fresh" and "Poppie Fresh"
characters engaged in sexual conduct); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183
(E.D. N.Y. 1972) ("Enjoy Cocaine" posters simulating Coca-Cola logo).
22.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. i (1995).
23.
See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005. Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Propertyof the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearingon H.R. 683].
24.
25.

See id.; H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 16(2005).
H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 17 (emphasis added).

2008]

565

DUMPING THE "DESIGNATION OF SOURCE"

683 was a key point of dispute.26 Further, the testimony from
Professor Lemley, the INTA President Anne Gundelfinger, and me at
the hearing also demonstrated quite clearly that the explicit intent of
the "designation of source" requirement in H.R. 683 was to require
trademark use by the defendant, and that AIPLA opposed the
language for that very reason.27 For example, Professor Lemley's
written testimony stated that the original bill would have made what
he characterized as "four changes in the existing legal rules,"
including the following:
H.R. 683 expressly adopts the requirement that the defendant use a
mark as a "designation of source." This is a familiar requirement
from traditional trademark law, where it is sometimes called the
"trademark use" requirement. Adding it to the dilution statute
provides an important safeguard against the use of the law to attack
free speech or legitimate competition....

Only where

the

defendant uses the famous mark as a mark - as a means
28 of
identifying their own goods - are the risks of dilution present.
Thus, Professor Lemley recognized that H.R. 683 was attempting to
add (not merely maintain) a trademark use requirement to the dilution
statute, and that the means for accomplishing this goal was the
"designation of source" language and not the "use of a mark or trade
name" language carried forward from the FTDA.
Similarly, my testimony (on behalf of AIPLA) and Ms.
Gundelfinger's (on behalf of INTA), as well as a statement submitted
on the day of the hearing by Susan Montgomery (on behalf of the
ABA IPL), specifically debated the "designation of source"
requirement in H.R. 683. For example, my written statement argued
that the requirement should be removed because it would eliminate
from the statute's reach "three important misuses of a famous mark,"

26. In fact, Professor Lemley and I exchanged copies of our testimony a few days prior to
the hearing and had a discussion focusing on this very language. I sent him an email on
February 14, 2005 observing that "it looks like our primary area of disagreement is on the
designation of source requirement." He replied that same day stating, "That is indeed an area of
disagreement, but it is a central one - I would not support the bill with this provision removed
because I think it would be capable of significant mischief." E-mail from Mark A. Lemley,
Professor, Stanford Law School, to William G. Barber, Managing Partner, Pirkey Barber (Feb.
14, 2005) (on file with author). Ironically, Professor Lemley's and Professor Dogan's article not
only appears to support the statute despite the removal of this "designation of source" provision,
but argues that this amendment somehow supports a trademark use requirement. Dogan &
Lemley, Trademark Use, supra note 3, at 553.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
28. Hearingon H.R. 683, supra note 23, at 21 (statement of Mark A. Lemley, Professor
of Law, Stanford University) (bold added).
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namely: "(1) domain name uses that do not fall under the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act; (2) tarnishing uses that are
not 'designation[s] of source for the [user's] goods or services'; and
(3) generic misuses. ' 9 We devoted several pages of AIPLA's
statement elaborating on these problems. 30 Similarly, Ms.
Montgomery's statement says:
Certain types of uses (in addition to fair uses) would be
undesirably and unnecessarily exempted from the statute. For
example, use of a famous mark as a domain name and obscene
uses seemingly would not qualify as designations of source and
thus not fall within the statute's scope. Use by a defendant of a
famous mark as a generic term would seem31to be quintessential
dilution, yet would not fall within the statute.
Ms. Gundelfinger's statement joins the debate, acknowledging
that "[s]ome have questioned whether the 'designation of source'
requirement narrows protection against dilution too much or imposes
too great a burden of proof on plaintiffs," and presenting 1NTA's
position on those points.32
E. Amendments Following the Hearing
As clear as it was that the designation of source requirement in
the original bill would have (and was intended to have) imposed a
trademark use requirement, it was equally clear to all those involved
that the intent in removing that language after the hearing was to
eliminate that requirement.
Shortly after the hearing, on February 23, 2005, the House IP
Subcommittee staff hosted a discussion/negotiation session regarding
H.R. 683 with representatives of AIPLA, 1NTA, and ACLU.3 3 At that
meeting, AIPLA, INTA, and ACLU agreed to a mark-up of H.R. 683.
Among other things, this mark-up (1) deleted the requirement in
Section 43(c)(1) that the defendant's use be "as a 'designation of
source' for his or her own goods or services, ' ' 3 and (2) added an
29. Id.at 24 (statement of William G. Barber, Partner, Fulbright and Jaworski, LLP, on
behalf of AIPLA).
30. See id. at 24-26.
31.
Id.at 61 (statement of Susan B. Montgomery, Vice Chair, ABA section of Intellectual
Property Law).
32. Id. at 16-17 (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, INTA).
33. Id.at 53 (letter from Alan C. Drewsen, Executive Director, INTA, and Michael K.
Kirk, Executive Director, AIPLA).
34. See id.Curiously, Professors Lemley and Dogan say the House IP Subcommittee
dropped this language "f[r]atherthan accept Barber's suggestion," when in fact that was exactly
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exclusion protecting "[f]air use of a famous mark by another person,
other than as a designation of source for the person's goods or
services, including for purposes of identifying and parodying,
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or its goods
or services. 35 This agreement was confirmed in a joint letter from
INTA and AIPLA to Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Howard
Berman dated February 28, 2005.36 IPO also supported these
amendments in a letter submitted March 2, 2005, stating, "The
proposed amendments to H.R. 683 would (a) delete the requirement
that a person must use a famous mark as a 'designation of source'
before this use can be deemed a 'diluting' use and (b) strengthen the
fair use exemption for famous marks used in parody or
commentary." 37 Both of these amendments (among others) were then
made at the House IP Subcommittee's mark-up on March 3, 2005,38
and the House Judiciary Committee approved the Subcommittee's
amendments on March 9, 2005. 39

In the House Report on H.R. 683, Representative Berman
submitted a statement that specifically discussed the agreement
between AIPLA, [NTA, and ACLU on these amendments:
[A]n amendment was adopted in Subcommittee to address the
First Amendment and free speech issues that were raised at the
hearing. The ACLU voiced concerns about the possibility that
critics could be stifled by the threat of an injunction for mere
likelihood of tarnishment. Furthermore, they were concerned with
the balance between the rights of trademark holders and the First
Amendment. ACLU joined with 1NTA and AIPLA in crafting a
separate exemption from a dilution cause of action for parody,
comment and criticism.
Finally, different intellectual property owners voiced
disagreement at the hearing regarding the designation of source
language in the bill. After some negotiation between the parties,
the conflict has been resolved, and both AIPLA and 1NTA support
the bill. I believe this legislation strikes the delicate balance
between protection of property rights and encouragement of

one of the changes I (on behalf of AIPLA) proposed at the hearing. See Dogan & Lemley,
Trademark Use, supra note 3, at 553.
35. Id. at 56 (Bill introduced by Mr. Smith of Texas) (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 53-58.
37. Id. at 59 (letter from J. Jeffrey Hawley, President, IPO).
38. H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 2, 6 (2005).
39. Id. at 6, 27-35.
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healthy competition.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill with
40
the amendment.

There is simply no doubt what the intent and effect of these
companion amendments were. First, particularly in light of the debate
among INTA, AIPLA, ABA IPL, and even Professor Lemley leading
up to the House IP Subcommittee hearing, the undeniable purpose of
removing the "designation of source" language from Section 43(c)(1)
was to eliminate the trademark use requirement that Professor Lemley
and INTA so staunchly advocated, 41 and AIPLA and ABA IPL so
vigorously opposed.42
Second, and perhaps even more telling from a strict statutory
construction standpoint, a new exclusion was introduced that requires
a defendant asserting fair use to prove (among other things) that it is
not making a trademark use. 43 If all non-trademark uses are immune
from challenge under the TDRA in the first place, as Professors
Lemley and Dogan claim, this exclusion would be superfluous.44
40. See Hearing on H.R. 683, supra note 23, at 25 (statement of Hon. Howard L. Berman,
Rep. in Congress from the State of Cal., and Ranking Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property).
41. Id. at 18-21 (testimony of Mark A. Lemley, Professor of Law, Stanford University);
id. at 6-17 (testimony of Anne Gundelfinger, President, INTA).
42. Id. at 21-24 (testimony William G. Barber, Partner, Fulbright and Jaworski, LLP, on
behalf of AIPLA); id at 60-62 (statement of Susan B. Montgomery, Vice Chair, ABA section of
Intellectual Property Law).
43. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggety Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir.
2007). ("[P]arody is not automatically a complete defense to a claim of dilution by blurring
where the defendant uses the parody as its own designation of source, i.e., as a trademark").
44. The quote Professors Lemley and Dogan extract out of context from Chairman
Smith's statement in no way supports their interpretation of the amendments to the bill. See
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3 , at 553. Indeed, this statement was made at the February 17,
2005 hearing, before the IP Subcommittee amended the bill. When Chairman Smith said in that
statement that the bill did not break new ground and "represents a clarification of what Congress
meant when it passed the dilution statute almost a decade ago", Hearing on H.R. 683, supra note
23, at 2, he was talking about the likelihood of dilution (as opposed to actual dilution) standard.
This is apparent from Rep. Berman's response where he said, "[tihe likelihood of dilution
standard would no longer unfairly require the senior user to wait until injury occurs before
bringing suit, and I think the Chairman is right. This is probably the standard Congress had
initially intended." Id. at 4. It is also apparent from colloquy between Chairman Smith and
witnesses at the previous IP Subcommittee hearing on April 22, 2004, where the Chairman
specifically asked the panelists whether they agreed with his understanding that the original
Congressional intent was for a likelihood of dilution standard. See Hearing to Amend the FTDA,
supra note 16, at 48. Three of the four witnesses agreed. Id. at 48-49.
Similarly, Professor Lemley's and Professor Dogan's assertion that "the House did
not intend to drop any trademark use requirement and therefore to expand dilution law
dramatically to permit suits against dictionaries, parodists, and a host of others who are not
using the plaintiff's mark to sell anything" is a straw man. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3 , at
553 (emphasis added). Of course Congress did not intend to expand dilution law in that way, but

2008]

DUMPING THE "DESIGNATION OF SOURCE"

569

III. MEANING OF THE PHRASE "USE OF A MARK OR TRADE NAME" IN
THE TDRA
One point on which I agree with Professors Lemley and Dogan
is that the phrase "use of a mark or trade name" in the TDRA refers to
what the defendant (not the plaintiff) is using. They may also be
correct that this distinction is clearer in the TDRA than it was in the
FTDA, 45 but this clarification had absolutely nothing to do with the
attempt to add a trademark use requirement to the TDRA. As
discussed above, that was solely and expressly the intent of the
"designation of source" language that was removed from the bill.
So what is the proper interpretation of the phrase "mark or trade
name" in the TDRA? The statute proscribes "use of a mark or trade
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark." 46 Thus, the relevant
question is whether the thing the defendant is using is "a mark or
trade name." The TDRA does not say it has to be the defendant's
mark however - only "a mark., 4 7 (Stated another way, the statute
does not require "use as a mark or trade name," but rather "use of a
mark or trade name"). If the defendant is using the plaintiff's mark (or
what would be perceived as the plaintiffs mark), it is "a mark" and
should qualify under this language from the TDRA regardless of
whether the defendant is using the mark to identify its own goods or
services. That is the only reasonable interpretation in light of the
legislative history of the act, which quite clearly removed any
requirement that the defendant be using the accused mark or trade
name as a designation of source for its own goods or services.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Lemley's and Professor Dogan's argument that the
TDRA incorporates a trademark use requirement simply does not
withstand scrutiny. The language in the TDRA they rely upon for this
conclusion (use of a "mark or trade name") was merely carried
dropping the trademark use requirement does not have that effect. That is what the exclusions
are for. In reality, the House did intend to drop the trademark use requirement and at the same
time protect various types of fair and noncommercial uses as set forth in the exclusions.
45. See Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use, supra note 3, at 555. It seems fairly obvious,
however, that the phrase "mark or trade name" in the FTDA referred to what the defendant was
using as well. The FTDA (like the TDRA) clearly and unambiguously required the plaintiff to
own a "famous mark," not a "trade name." Thus, the phrase "mark or trade name" could not
refer to the plaintiff's famous mark.
46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
47. Id.
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forward from the FTDA (arguably in a less restrictive form), and even
they concede that at least some courts construing the FTDA did not
impose a trademark use requirement.4 8 Indeed, in its original proposal
to amend the FTDA, INTA criticized this precise language, and said it
was critical to explicitly require in the new statute that the defendant
use the challenged mark or trade name "as a designation of source of
the person's goods or services," i.e. as a trademark. 49 The intent and
consequences of this explicit requirement in INTA's proposal were
openly debated in Congress.5" Following this debate, the participants
reached a compromise that removed the trademark use requirement,
and replaced it with a fair use provision protecting legitimate parody,
criticism, and commentary provided that the defendant does not make
trademark use of the plaintiffs mark. 5' Thus, the very language that
Professor Lemley and INTA argued to Congress was needed in the
bill to engraft a trademark use requirement into dilution claims was
specifically removed, and at the same time a new exclusion was
added to exempt only certain types of non-trademark uses. 52 In light
of this history, there is no credible argument that the TDRA as
enacted requires trademark use by the defendant.

48.
49.
INTA).

Dogan & Lemley, supra note 3, at 546.
Hearingon H.R. 683, supra note 23, at 7 (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President,

50.

See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.

51.

15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007). See also supra notes 34-35 and

accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

